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In implementing privacy protection in surveillance systems, designers 
must maximize privacy while retaining the system’s purpose. One way 
to achieve this is to combine data-hiding techniques with context-aware 
policies governing access to securely collected and stored data. 
I
n recent years there has been much discussion 
among researchers about privacy and its impact 
on ubiquitous computing.1-6 While all agree that 
privacy is necessary in ubicomp systems, the field 
is still in its infancy. Several proposed systems 
implement privacy protection in ubicomp environments,2,3,7 
but relatively few address privacy in what is possibly the 
first deployed ubicomp application: public surveillance. 
The most prominent is the Privacy Protected Video Sur-
veillance (Privacy Cam) system designed by Andrew 
Senior and colleagues.2 
However, this will soon change. Recent advances in 
surveillance technology, such as digital networked cam-
eras and permanent storage solutions, are extending the 
scope of surveillance environments, transforming cap-
tured footage into indexed and searchable data. This will 
increase intrusion into privacy, which in turn will motivate 
the need to implement privacy measures to control access 
to surveillance data. 
To be effective, such measures should be integrated 
into surveillance system design. Moreover, privacy policies 
applied to surveillance data should be altered dynamically 
in response to contextual factors to maximize privacy 
while fulfilling the system’s purpose. 
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CONTROLLING INFORMATION FLOW
Several ubicomp researchers4-6 have echoed the asser-
tion of legal scholar Alan R. Westin that “no definition of 
privacy is possible,” as privacy is highly subjective and 
dependent on goals or aims that are at times in conflict. 
For example, Jason Hong and James Landay6 argue that 
“rather than being a single monolithic concept, privacy is 
a fluid and malleable notion with a range of trust levels and 
needs.” This elusiveness has led to several theories about 
the nature of privacy. 
Social psychologist Irwin Altman’s privacy regulation 
theory5 views privacy as a dynamic boundary regulation 
process in which individuals use various tools, including 
verbal and nonverbal communication, to control interac-
tions with others to obtain their desired, thus optimal, level 
of privacy. This varies from person to person and changes 
according to the environment and circumstances. Bound-
ary control fails if privacy is too great, resulting in social 
isolation, or too low, resulting in crowding—receiving more 
input than desired. 
Controlling information flow is at the heart of Altman’s 
theory, which can be applied to ubicomp by extending the 
tools used to control communication to include computa-
tional devices, such as sensors, within the environment.5 
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It likewise underlies Westin’s definition of privacy as “the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.”4 
Ubicomp researchers have come to the same 
realization.3,6,8,9 For example, Victoria Bellotti and Abigail 
Sellen3 identified the importance of control and feedback 
in implementing privacy protection in ubicomp environ-
ments—that is, users within the environment should be 
given control over the data captured within the environ-
ment as well as feedback on the processing, sharing, and 
use of this information. In a similar vein, Scott Lederer, 
Anind Dey, and Jennifer Mankoff8 defined everyday privacy 
as “individual end users’ ongoing exposure to and influ-
ence over the collection of their personal information in 
ubicomp environments.” 
Occupants of ubicomp environments do not control 
all the information communicated about them. While 
Altman’s theory describes the negative impact of too 
much information input on privacy, it does not consider 
excessive information output. To address this, Jaakko 
Lehikoinen, Juha Lehikoinen, and Pertti Huuskonen5 
introduced the concept of leaking, the disclosure of 
data due to the unintentional or uncontrolled flow of 
information. 
Leaking is especially problematic in surveillance envi-
ronments, which can capture, store, and process a wide 
range of searchable data beyond occupants’ control. 
Advances in surveillance technology are compounding 
the problem, resulting in increasingly intrusive applica-
tions. For example, cameras in LCD screen billboards can 
determine properties of people looking at the billboard 
such as age and gender, and surveillance systems in shop-
ping malls can track customers’ whereabouts through their 
mobile phones. 
PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
Privacy is highly subjective, varying across cultures 
and individuals. However, technology will be a unify-
ing factor due to the loss of privacy that will result from 
surveillance.
Advocates of surveillance argue that people in a public 
space have no right to privacy due to the presence of 
others—that is, what someone does in public cannot be 
expected to remain private. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus that sur-
veillance systems pose a danger to privacy that should be 
debated and, ultimately, mitigated by legislative action.10 
For example, in the United Kingdom a recent report by 
the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE)11 recognized the 
impact of evolving technologies on such systems and called 
for research to develop ways of monitoring public spaces 
that minimize the impact on pri-
vacy. Significantly, the report was 
authored by both RAE engineers 
and social scientists from the UK’s 
Academy of Social Sciences. 
Just as technology can positively or negatively impact soci-
ety, so too does society influence technology. Researchers 
should develop privacy protection methods in conjunction 
with advances in surveillance technology to minimize the 
costs imposed by new legislative and regulatory require-
ments on the technology once it has been deployed. In 
addition, such methods should aim to maximize privacy 
while retaining the surveillance system’s purpose. Such an 
approach requires a dynamic method for applying privacy 
measures, as a single measure would either restrict the pur-
pose or fail to minimize privacy. To maximize privacy, the 
system must minimize the outward flow of information 
about occupants from the environment. 
To explore these requirements, we first examine the 
limitations associated with closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
systems, and contrast these with advances resulting from 
the move toward networked camera systems. We then 
consider why privacy should be integrated into surveil-
lance systems as they are developed, and subsequently 
propose a design approach for maximizing privacy in 
surveillance systems. 
CCTV: LIMITATIONS AND CONCERNS 
Nowhere is the use of CCTV systems more estab-
lished than in the UK. As of 2004, the country had 
some 4.3 million CCTV cameras like the one shown in 
Figure 1, approximately 15 percent of the total number of 
such cameras deployed worldwide.2 
Traditional CCTV systems in the UK use analog cam-
eras, which limit the amount of video data that can be 
stored and retrieved. In addition, the relatively poor qual-
ity of images, especially those captured by older cameras, 
can inhibit the data’s usefulness—for example, as evi-
dence against criminal suspects in court. Further, CCTV 
cameras are connected to closed networks controlled 
by a multitude of public and private organizations. The 
lack of standardization combined with policy differences 
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regarding the use of such systems can also make data 
retrieval problematic. 
These technological and practical limitations have min-
imized CCTV systems’ impact on privacy in the UK, which 
is arguably one of the freest societies in the world and thus 
particularly sensitive to threats to civil liberties. While the 
British public has expressed concern about CCTV systems, 
only a small fraction—1 percent of the population—has 
changed its behavior to avoid areas under surveillance.12 
Despite the public’s apparent ambivalence, numerous 
civil liberties groups have called attention to the privacy 
dangers of CCTV systems. Some organizations publicize 
the location of cameras so that people can travel through 
an area under surveillance without being caught on cam-
era.1 A proposed method for geotagging CCTV cameras 
enables mobile users to share the location and nature 
of surveillance systems with others.13 Such approaches 
reduce privacy intrusion by allowing people to control, to 
some extent, their information leak. 
The use of microphones in CCTV systems, the potential 
oversaturation of camera coverage, and human moni-
toring of surveillance footage have also aroused privacy 
concerns. Although such concerns have not entered the 
mainstream consciousness and forced CCTV system 
operators to implement more than the most basic pri-
vacy measures, generally relating to data access, this will 
change as technology advances. 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF SURVEILLANCE 
With analog CCTV technology, the inability to easily 
store, replicate, and process video footage limits informa-
tion leak. However, this is no longer the case with emerging 
networked, digital surveillance systems. As information 
leak increases, without allowing those observed to have 
control or feedback over the surveillance, the potential for 
privacy intrusion will grow. 
Numerous advances in digitization and networking 
technology will not only overcome the limitations of CCTV 
systems but also extend the scope of surveillance and, in 
doing so, increase its impact on privacy. Examples of this 
technology include the following: 
•	 Digital cameras: Advances in image sensor technology 
will increase image quality while decreasing camera 
size. 
•	 Permanent storage: The use of digital cameras, cou-
pled with the decreasing costs of storage, will lead 
to the permanent nondegrading storage of captured 
digital data. 
•	 Rapid data retrieval: The use of digital video will make 
it easier to index and retrieve data. 
•	 Mobile cameras: Digitization and networking technol-
ogy will enable surveillance cameras to be placed on 
mobile platforms such as public transport vehicles 
and aerial drones. 
Figure 1. Nowhere is the use of CCTV systems more established than in the UK. Source for left image: www.flickr.com/photos/
stephenjohnson/2899060572/sizes/0. Source for image on right: http:commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:One_nation_under_OCTV_1.jpg.
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•	 IP cameras: The use of Internet Protocol, particularly 
wireless, technology will enable the more efficient net-
working of surveillance cameras, which will in turn 
facilitate their deployment and access to footage. 
To illustrate how evolving digitization and network-
ing technology has improved surveillance effectiveness, 
consider the following statistics: In the UK, CCTV systems 
generally help to solve only about 3 percent of crimes, 
but this figure is between 15 and 20 percent where more 
advanced technology and methods are in place.14 Decreas-
ing camera prices, in conjunction with wireless technology, 
have increased both the proliferation and quality of sur-
veillance systems, particularly in places where CCTV is less 
prevalent, such as the US.15 Organizations will be able to 
cost-effectively deploy newer, better systems and extend 
or replace older technologies—for example, expensive, 
mechanical pan-tilt-zoom cameras, with cheap, static, 
digital cameras with overlapping fields of view. To boost 
safety, select public transport vehicles in London are being 
outfitted with exterior and interior surveillance cameras 
that provide real-time images to authorities.16
Technology advances have also enabled multisensor 
surveillance. Cameras with omnidirectional microphones, 
which are not restricted by viewpoint, can be a powerful 
surveillance tool. Alternatively, directional microphones 
can be used to target audio—for example, a conver-
sation—at a distance of about 100 meters. However, 
uncertainties in matching what the system sees with what 
it hears have aroused strong resistance to camera micro-
phones by privacy watchdogs, who quickly introduced 
measures to limit their use.17
Advances in image processing will make it easier to 
search and interpret visual data captured by surveillance 
cameras. Law-enforcement agencies have deployed vehicle 
number plate recognition systems since the 1980s, and 
various government organizations are prototyping face-
recognition systems using limited datasets.18 Such systems 
ultimately have the potential to record a person’s complete 
movements in time and space. 
In concert, these evolving technologies move surveil-
lance beyond the concept of a static, isolated camera 
“watching” a public space to an all-seeing eye that can 
convert an individual’s everyday movements and habits 
into permanently stored, indexed, searchable data that 
can be processed in many different ways. The argument by 
surveillance advocates that people in a public space should 
have no expectation of privacy from a camera, which is 
merely another occupant in that space, no longer holds. 
The camera is not just another anonymous face in the 
crowd, but an entity following you around all the time. 
INTEGRATING PRIVACY INTO SURVEILLANCE 
As surveillance becomes increasingly intrusive, public 
opposition to these technologies will grow. Lawmakers 
will be pressured to force organizations that develop and 
deploy surveillance systems to incorporate additional pri-
vacy protections. However, because legislation tends to lag 
behind technology, such measures will inevitably inhibit 
preexisting systems’ functionality. Designing surveillance 
systems with privacy in mind, rather than as an after-
thought, will accelerate the adoption of privacy policies 
in surveillance and reduce the impact of enforced privacy 
measures.6
For example, Google did not foresee privacy issues with 
Street View and thus did not incorporate privacy protec-
tions into the initial release of this feature in 2007. In 
response to public outcry, the company instituted several 
measures including the blurring of facial images and vehi-
cle number plates and reducing image resolution to limit 
discernible information about pedestrians and vehicles. 
However, there is still considerable debate as to whether 
these measures go far enough; other identifying data such 
as location, clothes, and stature/gait are evident in Street 
View and may violate local privacy laws.
Privacy as an optimization problem
We view privacy as an optimization problem with 
respect to information flow. Assuming that people gener-
ally wish to reveal as little about themselves as possible, a 
surveillance system should deliver the maximum amount 
of data the observers require to achieve their purpose 
while minimizing intrusion on the observed. For example, 
providing those within a monitored environment with the 
highest degree of privacy would entail removing images of 
people from the video altogether, which would render the 
footage useless. Conversely, requiring everyone entering 
the space to submit to extreme identification methods, 
such as carrying a radio-frequency identification tag, 
would be socially unacceptable. 
Applying this approach to Street View, we first consider 
the tool’s purpose: to provide views of streets and buildings 
as an aid to navigation and exploration—not to observe 
pedestrians occupying the streets. Thus, to maximize 
privacy, ideally all pedestrian data should be filtered to 
remove identifying information. At the same time, to maxi-
mize its effectiveness, the system should have the highest 
image resolution possible.
A surveillance system should deliver 
the maximum amount of data the 
observers require to achieve their 
purpose while minimizing intrusion 
on the observed. 
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is implemented using image scrambling 
based on encryption, authorization could 
be in the form of possession of a relevant 
decryption key.19 A more comprehensive 
approach proposed by Senior and col-
leagues limits access to three types of data 
according to the user’s authorization level.2 
Law-enforcement personnel could access 
the entire video, “privileged” users could 
access a rerendered video with certain pri-
vacy-sensitive information removed, and 
“ordinary” users could access statistics—
for example, the number of people in the 
monitored environment. 
Context-aware surveillance
A single privacy policy is too restrictive 
to effectively balance the conflicting goals 
of maximizing surveillance functional-
ity and minimizing privacy intrusion. 
The resulting system tends to be either 
too intrusive or limited in scope. What is 
required is a dynamic data hiding approach 
that adjusts the privacy policy over time 
to meet the observers’ requirements while 
providing the observed with an acceptable 
level of privacy. 
The observer’s privacy-related goals can be 
incorporated into the system by accounting 
not only for the observer’s trust level—that 
is, via authorization—but also the context 
in which the observer uses the system. For 
example, if the observer’s job is to monitor 
crowd flow through an underground subway 
station to relieve congestion when it occurs, 
the observer does not need to access raw 
video footage. Rather, obscuring the fore-
ground of the image frame with a single solid color would 
give sufficient details regarding the number of people pres-
ent. The foreground indicates movement within the image, 
which in turn indicates people’s motion through the scene. 
Such a technique could also be combined with motion 
analysis to provide more information regarding movement 
through the frame. 
The system should also consider what is happening 
in the monitored space. By linking privacy measures to 
environmental context, such measures can be adjusted to 
changes or events. For example, in normal circumstances 
the system would provide a high level of privacy protec-
tion—say, by replacing people in the image with blobs or 
bounding boxes—but if an alarm activates, the system 
could reduce privacy protection to enable an observer to 
verify that the event was correctly detected and to take the 
appropriate action. 
Data hiding
The way most surveillance systems trade off data and 
privacy requirements is to first determine an appropriate 
privacy policy and then apply this to the data using a data 
hiding or abstraction technique.
Data hiding is achieved in video streams by detecting 
a region of interest that corresponds to privacy-sensitive 
information and removing or obscuring it. Faces, people, 
and license plates are common ROIs. Examples of this 
approach include removing images of people (and binary 
images representing their silhouettes)7 or scrambling such 
images at different resolution levels.19 As Figure 2 shows, the 
approach adopted by Google’s Street View is to detect and 
blur vehicle number plates and faces within images. 
Surveillance systems typically apply a single privacy 
policy and hide data by default, enabling only authorized 
persons to access the raw data. For example, if data hiding 
Figure 2. In response to public outcry over the intrusiveness of its Street View 
feature, Google instituted several privacy-protecting measures, including 
the blurring of facial images and vehicle number plates and reducing image 
resolution to limit discernible information about pedestrians and vehicles.
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for ubiquitous computing applications, as one of the main 
purposes of such applications is to observe.
The best way to think about privacy in this context is in 
terms of controlling information flow. In the case of ubi-
comp systems, information flows between people as they 
interact. In addition, people interact indirectly with their 
environment when they are monitored by sensors such 
as video cameras and microphones. It is information leak 
that results in the loss of privacy associated with ubicomp 
systems. Preventing the loss of privacy requires measures 
that stop or control information leak. This is especially true 
for surveillance systems, which by nature are intrusive 
and, with continuing advances in technology, are capable 
of capturing and storing increasing amounts of data. 
When implementing privacy protection in surveillance 
environments, designers must minimize information 
leak while retaining the system’s purpose. One way to 
achieve this balance is to combine various data-hiding 
techniques with context-aware rules governing access to 
securely collected and stored data. Adjusting the privacy 
policy according to the objective of the surveillance and 
the situation within the environment makes it possible to 
dynamically satisfy the needs of both the observers and 
those being observed.
While privacy is a social issue, the underlying cause 
of the loss of privacy due to surveillance is technological. 
Consequently, protecting privacy in monitored environ-
ments requires a sociotechnical approach. Reciprocity, or 
feedback, is one such approach that will increase trust in 
effective surveillance systems. 
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